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1. Introduction
Plenty of economic phenomena cannot be explained in the absence of family 
structure. For example, the immense changes in women's labor force participation 
are strongly affected by family structure: married women work less than  
single, and mothers work less than childless women (Greenwood et al. 2017).  
A significant share of these differences is a result of the family-specific design 
 of tax and social security systems (Borella et al. 2019). Family structure is also  
a natural framework for studying intergenerational mobility and parent-child 
correlations. More and more macroeconomics papers reconcile the importance of 
a family and explicitly model decisions within the household. In this paper,  
we propose a systematic overview of this stream of literature. 
We are not the first ones to review family economics in the context of 
macroeconomics, e.g. Browning et al. (2014). Doepke and Tertilt (2016) provide 
an excellent summary of advances in family economics and its successes in 
explaining classic macroeconomics phenomena. We extend their study by 
focusing on family-dependent policy interventions, the joint aspect of taxation, 
and the impact of labor market structure on fertility. What is more, an outstanding 
guideline of family economics models by Greenwood et al. (2017) pointed out 
several remaining research questions – concerning childcare subsidies, fertility 
policies, taxation, and within-family insurance. We prove that many of them have 
already received a satisfactory empirical and theoretical answer. 
The definition of family differs substantially across macroeconomics literature. 
However, we can systematize these definitions using two dimensions: the 
household structure and decision process. We can distinguish two types of 
households: the first consists of the parent(s) and child(ren), the second consists 
of husband and wife. The latter fits analyzing gender inequality, unequal tax 
treatment, or family-dependent components of social security. The parent(s) and 
child(ren) family structure is the most common and helps explaining human 
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capital accumulation, inequality, and fertility decisions. Both setups are employed 
to study different drivers of women's labor force participation. 
In terms of the decision-making process, we can distinguish unitary households 
and households based on game-theoretic bargaining models. The members of the 
unitary household maximize the so-called household utility function, which 
describes the joint interests of all household members under aggregated budget 
constraint. However, the formation, as well as the dissolution of a partnership, 
usually require decisions of the individuals involved. Thus, it always contains the 
possibility of conflict. Bargaining models better reflect this feature and describe 
household behavior as the cooperation of utility-maximizing individuals. Despite 
that, the unitary household is a typical framework, even in recent literature. 
Models with bargaining are mostly used to describe the formation and stability  
of marriage and recently to analyze fertility decisions. 
In the following part of the paper, we review both macroeconomics and family 
economics literature in the context of labor force participation, fertility choice, 
human capital accumulation, inequality and taxes, and social security. Depending 
on the policy in question, the literature proposes models with significantly 
different structures and features, e.g., types of heterogeneity, choice set, applied 
utility functions, and model timing. All of them contribute to the mechanism 
of the model and its fit to the data (Borella et al. 2018). We discuss below different 
model setups, with particular caution to policies' welfare effect. In this way, we 
provide a method guideline useful for future research. 
2. Working parents and fertility
The labor-force participation of women increased sharply during the twentieth 
century. Even a more considerable increase has been observed for married 
women. However, the employment rate of married women with and without 
children still differs substantially. The size of the gap varies noticeably across 
countries. Child-related transfers and family policies can account for a considerable 
part of this variation (Hannusch 2019). Childcare and parental leaves are essential 
tools for reducing labor market cost of motherhood and, therefore, more gender 
equality in the labor market. 
Almost all OECD countries offer paid leaves to parents of a newborn (parental 
leaves). However, systems differ significantly between countries both in terms  
of length of parental leave and the generosity of transfers. 
There is a consensus in the literature that parental leave has a positive impact 
on the labor market. Byker (2016) shows that the availability of parental leave 
increases labor-force attachment. Parental leave increases labor force participation 
as well (Blau and Khan 2016; Stichnoth 2019; Yamaguchi 2019). 
The welfare effects of parental leave are not unambiguous. Erosa et al. (2010) 
show that the introduction of paid parental leave benefits women substantially due 
to the redistribution effect and a stronger bargaining position on the labor market. 
The increase in women's welfare occurs at the expense of the welfare of men, and 
aggregate welfare effects are negative. However, Bastani et al. (2019) show that 
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parental leave leads to welfare improvement if we account for the fact that firms 
have to offer standardized contracts to all employers. Without parental leave, more 
family-oriented worker obtains a suboptimal level of contract flexibility due  
to asymmetric information or anti-discrimination legislation. 
The critical but absent ankle in researches mentioned above is household structure 
and, thus, insurance within a family. As Tominey (2016) shows, parental leave 
enables mothers to come back to work quickly if the father receives negative 
productivity shock, thus reduce the magnitude of a negative income shock. 
Blundell et al. (2018) obtain similar results. Lower-income risk comes at the 
expense of time spent with children. When negative income shock hits fathers, 
mothers work more, as residual earner model would predict. Due to the 
complementarity of leisure between wife and husband, working mothers spend 
less time with children and stay at home fathers do not compensate for that. Thus, 
if we take into consideration the welfare of the child, the effect is ambiguous. Both 
studies consider the US economy, where parental leave is unpaid. Paid parental 
leave would lead to a higher degree of insurance within the family because income 
smoothing may happen without cutting time devoted to childcare. 
Public childcare addresses the asymmetry in childcare burden. Doepke and 
Kinderman (2019) show that the fertility level across countries increases with the 
fraction of the childcare burden taken by fathers. Using a quantitative model of 
household bargaining, they show that policies targeted to help mothers, i.e., public 
childcare, increases fertility level and welfare more effectively than nontargeted 
policies (e.g., direct child transfers). Childcare helps limit the depreciation of 
mothers' human capital. Guner et al. (2020) analyze public childcare in a model 
where human capital is a direct function of labor force participation. More 
affordable childcare relaxes time constraints and thus increases labor force 
participation. Hence human capital and welfare increase as well. 
The natural alternative to maternal childcare is grandparental care. The access to 
grandparents' help increases mothers' labor force participation (see e.g. Posadas 
and Vidal-Fernandez 2013; Yu et al. 2019). However, it not necessarily leads to 
an increase in women's income due to lower mobility (Garcia-Moran and Kuehn 
2017). There is also plenty of empirical evidence of the positive impact of formal 
childcare on child development (Currie and Thoms 1995; Boca et al. 2016b). 
The marketization of childcare is a more and more important alternative to 
informal and public childcare as the gender gap shrinks, and income inequality 
grow. The marketization of childcare help explains why over the last 40 years, the 
US total fertility rate has been rather stable, while female wages have continued 
to grow. Rising relative wages increase women's labor supply and, due to higher 
opportunity cost, lower fertility at first. However, it also leads to a reallocation 
of home production and childcare from women to men and a marketization of 
childcare, which counteracts the first-order effect (Siegel 2017). 
The marketization of childcare may also explain why highly educated women no 
longer have fewer children, contrary to a standard assumption of strictly negative 




there are three possible explanations: group composition, medical advantages, and 
marketization of home production, including childcare. As more women get an 
education, more highly educated women enter marriages and build a family. 
Medical improvement enables highly educated women to realize postponed 
fertility. Finally, women with high education can reduce the time spent on 
childcare and purchase more services as substitutes. Bar et al. (2018) propose  
a theoretical framework to formalize this intuition. They assume that parental time 
investment is necessary to raise a child. However, parental time may be substitute 
by paid childcare. Due to increment in income inequality, the relative price of 
childcare drop for high-income households. They showed that changes in 
inequality could quantitatively account for much of the changing relationship 
between mothers' education and fertility over time. 
Not only fertility and family policies shape the labor market decisions of parents, 
but also the labor market condition affects fertility decisions. Wage uncertainty is 
an essential channel of this interaction. Having a child is a long-term commitment; 
thus, more insecurity regarding future income implies lower intended fertility rate 
and longer postponement of first birth (Sommer 2016). 
Guner et al. (2019) study how uncertainty created by temporary and open-ended 
contracts combined with the inflexibility of work schedules reduces the fertility 
level of women with higher education. In a life-cycle model with endogenous 
fertility, endogenous labor, and skill formation, they show that reduction of the 
labor market duality and inflexibility of work schedules increase the completed 
fertility of college-educated from 1.52 to 1.88. Due to reform, women have more 
children and have them earlier. The labor force participation of women increases. 
The employment gap between mothers and non-mothers shrinks. Lopes (2019) 
use a similar setup to study the effect of the decline of job security in Portugal  
on fertility. She shows that job security is especially crucial at first birth.  
For subsequent birth decisions, the income effect is relatively more important. 
Another significant stream of literature analyzes the interaction between fertility 
and income risk on the aggregate level. On the one hand, wages decline observed 
during recessions lowers the cost of having a child in terms of foregone earnings. 
Thus, fertility may increase during the recession. On the other hand, the presence 
of the borrowing constraints makes poorer households unable to cover the 
consumption cost of an additional child (Papagni 2006, Filoso and Papagni 2015). 
The above mechanism may be reinforced by the "added- worker" effect and even 
further by the gender asymmetry within the industries (Coskun and Dalgic 2019). 
Empirical studies show fertility decline during the Great Recession (Matysiak et 
al. 2018), the Great Depression (Sobotka et al. 2011, Jones and Schoonbroodt 
2016), the fall of the Berlin Wall (Liepmann 2018), and post-communist countries 
(Billingsley 2010). It suggests that the economic constraints and uncertainty 
channel are more important than the lower opportunity cost of having a child. 
Lower fertility, due to labor market uncertainty, should concern social planer. The 
stochastic character of fertility (see Wolpin 1984; Hotz and Miller 1993), implies 
that the total number of children depends not only on couples' intentions but also 




too high or too low fertility as an outcome. Imperfect contraception, combined 
with income risk, may lead to unwanted pregnancies. Abortions are important 
fertility control mechanisms, especially when unplanned pregnancy coincides 
with unfavorable income realization (Choi 2017, Miller et al. 2020). Income 
shocks cause postponing birth. Taking into account the decline in fertility with 
women's age, it may lead to suboptimal fertility realization. Both IVF and 
abortions help to overcome the market's incompleteness in the aspect of fertility 
and to close the gap between the desired and the realized number of children. 
 
3. Human capital accumulation 
With family structure, two channels are affecting human capital accumulation of 
the young generation – characteristics of parents and parental investments. In light 
of rising inequality, one needs to realize that human capital investments are the 
vehicle for social mobility. Since education also generates positive externalities 
(e.g., peer group effect, exchange of ideas), there is also a strong inducement for 
governments to promote investments in human capital. Moreover, market 
imperfections distort private investment choices, making room for policy 
interventions. Since they are very costly, it is necessary to quantify their effects. 
There is extensive empirical literature on this subject (Acemoglu and Angrist 
2001; Krueger and Lindahl 2001; Heckman and Mosso 2014). 
The inability to finance human capital investments through financial markets (and 
because of their imperfections) is often listed as the leading cause of policy 
intervention (Keane and Wolpin 2001). However, in an excellent overview  
of human capital policies, Heckman and Carneiro (2003) estimated that "only 8% 
of American youth are credit constrained in the traditional usage of that term". 
Still, despite empirical skepticism towards intergenerational borrowing 
constraints hypothesis (Mulligan 1999; Heckman and Mosso 2014; Boca et al. 
2016a), the literature widely employed Becker and Tomes (1986) model for policy 
analysis. A key feature in their approach is that parents cannot borrow for human 
capital investments against the future income of their children. Recently, their 
two-period framework expands in a way that parents can invest in the human 
capital of their children along the multiple life stages, which is also in line with 
empirical result (Cuhna et al. 2006).  
Challenging previous findings, Caucutt and Lochner (2019) investigate the role of 
borrowing constraints in a life-cycle model with two stages of human capital 
investments. Later on, they extend the analysis into a dynastic framework.  
To provide a tool for quantitative analysis, they equipped their model with 
earnings shocks that allow wages to variate within education classes. Also, their 
borrowing constraints depend positively on the future human capital of an 
individual. They find that almost half of the young parents and 12% of old parents 
face borrowing constraints. Increasing the borrowing limit of the young parents 
by only half of the average monthly income improves early human capital 
investments by 11% and college graduation rates by 10%. These effects are more 
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significant for college-educated parents because they are the ones facing credit 
constraints for offspring's human capital investments. 
Koeniger and Prat (2018) combined both characteristics of parents and parental 
investments with a parental decision on bequests. They employ a dynastic model 
featuring hidden stochastic abilities and ex ante heterogeneous productivity 
persistent across generations. First, they find that parental human capital 
investments should be decreasing in bequests. It stems from the fact that receiving 
inheritance translates to the increase in wealth and hence to the decrease in labor 
force participation (see also Holtz-Eakin et al. 1993). Second, because the abilities 
of children are positively correlated with parental earnings, publicly provided 
human capital investments should be increasing in parental labor income and 
decreasing in their wealth. Third, the optimal policy is to tax bequests and 
subsidize human capital accumulation. The risky human capital investments and 
hidden abilities of children are the driving force of this result. The study also 
provides a compelling argument in the discussion about the persistence 
of earnings across generations. According to the paper, the intergenerational 
earnings elasticity observed in data is close to the social optimum. 
4. Inequality and taxes
The importance of inherited wealth and parental background has recently attracted 
much attention in the academic literature (Boserup et al. 2018; Abott et al. 2019; 
Fogli and Guerrieri 2019). With the development of finite-horizon models,  
it becomes possible to study intergenerational interactions in the macroeconomic 
framework – for example, in the context of taxation and other policies supporting 
equity. Even though the intergenerational mobility seems to be stable over the last 
decades (Chetty et al. 2014), with rising inequality providing the equality 
of opportunities assumes growing importance.  
A standard approach in taxation literature is to judge against two criteria of equity 
and efficiency. While equity is hard to measure and its evaluation requires 
explicitly defined criteria, the efficiency indicate minimizing distortions  
to economic output. Until recently, Chamley (1986) and Judd's (1985) result 
suggested optimality of zero capital income tax rate (ergo taxation on wealth, 
bequests, or any accumulated factor). It stems from the fact that tax on capital 
income generates distortion on intertemporal choices. However, Straub and 
Werning (2020) show that when the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is less 
than or equal to one, the long-run optimal tax rate is positive. For elasticity higher 
than one, the tax rate converges to zero, but it might stick to positive values for 
ages before so. They were not the first ones to challenge the zero tax rate result 
(Piketty and Saez 2013). By relaxing assumptions about the model, i.e., accounting 
for idiosyncratic labor income shocks (Krueger and Ludwig 2018) or accidental 
bequests (Blumkin and Sadka 2004), the result of untaxing capital can be overturned. 
Intergenerational transfers can take the form of passing estates, inheritance, 
accidental bequests, and inter vivos (during lifetime) gifts. All of them might 




be (Kopczuk 2013; Piketty and Saez 2013; Saez and Stantcheva 2018). The 
rationale behind it is that taxes on transfers are highly progressive, and they level 
the wealth concentration. Koeniger and Prat (2018) find that at the social 
optimum, the wedge for human capital is much lower than the wedge for bequests. 
Hence, human capital investments are often subsidized, whereas bequests should be 
universally taxed. However, there was no agreement on this matter for a long time.  
To understand those conflicting results, one should focus on model choices that 
drive the differences. Curiously enough, the motivations behind bequeathal 
decisions are also crucial in determining the efficiency of taxation (Gale et al. 
2001; Cremer and Pestieau 2006). 
Becker and Tomes (1979), followed by Davies (1986), show that in dynastic 
framework with idiosyncratic labor productivity shocks, the rise in estate tax 
increases long-run inequality and deteriorates welfare. They model pure dynastic 
altruism and, in their setup income of subsequent generations, directly enter the 
utility function of the current generation. This model choice causes two 
amplifying effects. Firstly, the higher the taxes on bequests, the lower the 
averaging labor productivity luck in a lineage. This inheritance effect alters "how 
much luck" is passed from the previous generation on to the present and 
consequently changes current income. Secondly, the rise in taxes leads to a drop 
in government revenues through redistribution effect. As a result, the lump-sum 
transfer from the government to households is lower, causing inequality to 
increase. However, the direction of the redistribution effect changes with the 
employed utility function.  
Under the warm-glow or joy-of-giving motive, bequest taxation has an equalizing 
effect. In this setup, bequest enters the utility function as a consumption 
expenditure in the last period of life. Further, with Cobb-Douglas preferences, 
taxation is neutral to average wealth and thus, by lowering the variance  
of bequests, indicates lower wealth inequality. As proved by Bossman et al. 
(2007), followingly by Wan and Zhu (2019), the redistribution effect dominates 
the inheritance effect. Redistribution reduces the variance of wealth while keeping 
the average wealth constant and consequently decrease the inequality, measured 
not only as a coefficient of variation but also as the Gini coefficient. This result 
also holds for different forms of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility 
function (Heer 2001; De Nardi and Yang 2016).  
As pointed out by Cremer and Pestieau (2006), there are two primary ways to tax 
intergenerational wealth transfers – with the estate and inheritance taxation. What 
is worth emphasizing, both taxes can implement the optimal allocation, but we 
refrain from a detailed review on this topic. However, drawing from the literature 
on optimality, one should stress that from a policy perspective, the inheritance tax 
is preferable. Firstly, the optimal formula of bequest taxation depends much not 
only on the magnitude of inheritance but also on the behavioral response of future 
generations (Piketty and Saez 2013). Hence, it seems reasonable to impose a tax 
on the donee rather than the donor (Kopczuk 2013). Secondly, when allowing for 
household heterogeneity in the number of children, it is not possible to derive 
optimal estate tax formula independent of the family size (Fahri and Werning 
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2010). At the same time, there exists the inheritance tax that implements the 
optimal allocation. Furthermore, when heterogenous households treat their 
children unequal with their share in a bequest, a social optimum may require 
progressive inheritance taxation rather than estate taxation that is calculated on 
the aggregate (Cremer et al. 2011). Nevertheless, the existing wealth transfers 
taxation schemes are very far from the optimal formulas derived in the literature. 
For more details on optimality, see Chari and Kehoe (1999), Golosov et al. (2003), 
Kocherlakota (2005), Fahri and Werning (2010), Piketty and Saez (2013) and 
Stantcheva (2020).  
By incorporating family structure into macroeconomics models, it becomes 
possible to study another aspect of taxation – separate versus joint taxation.  
With separate household taxation, each earner's marginal tax rate increases only 
in his own income; in systems of joint taxation, one earner's marginal tax rate 
increases not only in his own income but also in the income of someone else. Thus, 
it heavily influences the labor supply within the household, and consequently 
partially explains gender differences in labor force participation (Apps and Rees 
2004; Kaygusuz 2010; Guner et al. 2012; Guner et al. 2014; Bick and Fuchs-
Schündeln 2017; Borella et al. 2019). Moreover, it is also significant from the 
perspective of optimality. Wu and Krueger (2020) demonstrate that when 
accounting for joint taxation and idiosyncratic wage shocks, the optimal degree of 
tax progressivity is substantially lower than what suggest one-earner models.  
It stems from the fact that in one-earner models, the progressivity, precautionary 
savings, and social security are the only sources of insurance against idiosyncratic 
shocks. To capture this mechanism, one should account for endogenous labor, 
or alternatively residual, or binary labor supply for the secondary earner in two-
earner models.  
Using a model with binary labor supply for the secondary earner, Kleven et al. 
(2009) portray the household decision as a multi-dimensional screening problem. 
Brett (2007) and Cremer et al. (2012) also employed this approach. In their setup, 
the decision-makers are heterogeneous with respect to marital status, abilities, and 
taste for work. Those parameters are unobservable by the principal (government 
or tax authorities) who wants to maximize social welfare. Those studies build 
extensively on the literature solving one-dimensional screening problem in the 
spirit of Mirrlessian optimality (Apps and Rees 2011; Alesina et al. 2011). In fact, 
optimal taxation calls for negative jointness. It means that the tax rate on the 
secondary earner should be decreasing in the earnings of the primary worker.  
It results from a social planner's interest in redistribution from two-earner 
households to one-earner households with low primary earnings. Surprisingly, 
many tax-transfer schemes in Europe feature negative jointness, which is driven 
by many family-based governmental transfers (Kleven et al. 2009). However, 
reforms that lower the tax burden on the secondary earner in the household are 
welfare improving through the labor supply channel. 
The negative jointness as an optimal tax scheme also results from the study by Gayle 
and Shephard (2019). Their approach includes a marriage market equilibrium and 




Introducing joint versus separate taxation is welfare improving, but those gains  
are relatively small. However, the welfare gains are increasing as the gender wage gap 
is growing. 
 
5. Family and social security 
There are three main reasons why accounting for families is essential in the social 
security context: the design of the pension system, insurance within the family, 
and the pension-fertility link. 
First, family structure affects retirement incentives and, thus, decisions. Pension 
benefits design implies a high implicit tax and discourages the labor supply of the 
secondary earner. Borella et al. (2019) show that elimination of survivor benefits 
and spousal pension would increase labor force participation of married women 
by 10-20 percentage points. A similar magnitude of labor force reaction has been 
presented by Guner et al. (2012). Sánchez-Marcos and Bethencourt (2018) 
replicate those results in a model that accounts for human capital loss due to 
nonparticipation. Groneck and Wallenius (2019) and Kaygusuz (2015) use  
a simpler model with a less elastic labor supply. They account for a 6% increase 
in women labor force supply due to the elimination of the family dependent 
components. Nishiyama (2019) shows that labor market effects are much smaller 
if one accounts for utility from home production. Survivor benefits and spousal 
pension imply redistribution mostly to single-earner married households and thus 
favor married women over singles — such redistribution calls welfare concerns in the 
context of the rising share of single mothers. In all of the mentioned papers, 
elimination of family dependent components of the pension system increases welfare. 
The design of pension benefits also leads to coordination in couple’s retirement 
decisions, see Coile (2004), and Casanova (2010) for the US. However, couples 
use to retire together, even if the pension system does not generate such strong 
incentives as US spousal pension, see Hospido and Zamarro (2014). The potential 
reason may be couples' preferences, namely leisure complementarities between 
spouses and assortative mating. If couples enjoy spending leisure time together, 
the marginal utility of retirement would be higher if the spouse is already retired. 
Similarities in preference for leisure can explain retirement at a similar time. 
Michaud et al. (2019) show evidence of complementarities in partners' leisure and 
a positive correlation between partners' labor supply preferences. However, the 
first channel dominates. Even if the reason behind joint retirement is not well 
understood yet, the spillover effects of pension system reform are huge and cannot 
be ignored. For example, Coile (2004) finds that the omission of spillover effects 
biases the estimated effect of policies aimed to enhance longer labor force 
participation by 13% to 20%. Thus, there is a need to replace the individual model 
of retirement by a collective model of multi-person households while studying 
pension system reform.  
Second, the family helps mitigate wage risk. When negative income shock 
realized, a single individual can adjust their labor and savings. For individuals 
living in couples, there is an additional channel of insurance; namely, the labor 
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supply of both partners can be adjusted. De Nardi et al. (2019) show that in 
the US, family insurance plays a more critical role than the one offered by the 
government. On the other hand, in countries with more generous welfare states 
like the Netherlands, family insurance was "crowded-out" by government transfer. 
Nakabayashi (2019) proposes a model to explain the differences in the size of 
government support across nations. A more extended welfare state is likely to be 
chosen in civil law countries, like Germany or Japan, whose family law arranges 
a higher duty of support within the family. Thus, government insurance is higher 
in countries that use to have a high level of family insurance. 
Family and government insurance works differently for different income levels of 
individuals. Income risk is the highest for impoverished and wealthy households, 
i.e., the first and the last decile of earnings. The common pattern across countries
is that family risk-sharing plays a more prominent role for high-income 
individuals, and government insurance is mostly addressed to poor households, 
see De Nardi et al. (2019). However, even after government transfer, in the US, 
the standard deviation of income remains the highest among the first decile of 
earners. Those households are also more likely to be run by a single individual  
(or single parent) and thus have limited access to family insurance, see Watson 
and McLanahan (2011) and Schneider et al. (2019). 
Third, there is plenty of cross-country evidence that fertility level is negatively 
correlated with the size of pension system. The observed pattern is in line with the 
Boldrin and Jones' (2002) model of fertility decisions. In contrast to Barro and 
Becker's (1989) model where children are a consumption good, Boldrin and Jones 
(2002) assume that children serve investment purposes and ensure parental 
consumption in the after-work periods. As the size of the old-age support offered 
by the government increases, the incentives to have children shrink. Boldrin et al. 
(2015) show that the size of the pension system accounts for 55-65% of the 
observed difference in the US-Europe fertility rate. Fenge and Scheubel (2017) 
use the introduction of Bismarck's pension system and show the negative impact 
of public pensions on fertility. Billari and Galasso (2014), based on the pension 
benefits cut in 90-ties in Italy, show that even in modern societies, investment 
motive prevails, and benefits cut implies a rise in fertility rate. 
The fertility rate is not only lower but also too low in the presence of the pension 
system. Schoonbroot and Tertilt (2014) show that the lack of property rights for 
children's future income implies too low child-related investment. The public 
pension system operating on a PAYG basis offers a contract between parents and 
unborn children and forces born children to support retireed parents, thus 
complete the market. However, the standard PAYG pension system links the 
aggregate income of future generations, therefore the average fertility rate, with 
the pension benefits on today's parents. Hence children generate private cost and 
public benefits. Fenge and Meier (2009) and Fenge and von Weizsäcker (2010) 
show that the socially optimal fertility rate may be obtained by the mix of standard 
PAYG system and individual fertility-related pensions. Child-related subsidies 
may achieve the same allocation as a fertility-related pension (see Fenge and 
Meier 2009). Cremer et al. (2011) show that if endogenous human capital 
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accumulation is taken into account, one should consider subsidy education and 
tax the number of children. 
6. Conclusion and avenues for further research
The growing stream of macroeconomic literature acknowledges that the 
interactions within the family are vital in explaining many economic regularities. 
We propose a systematic review of this literature in the context of inequality 
and taxes, human capital accumulation, social security, labor force participation, 
and fertility choice. We concentrate on externalities and market failures that 
appear or escalate when one accounts for interaction within the family. We discuss 
the policy recommendations addressing these externalities and market failures. 
We put special attention to the welfare effect and critical elements of the models' that 
drive the results. Hence, we present a method guideline valuable for future research. 
Incorporating recent advances in empirical work on human capital accumulation 
is a major challenge for family economics. First, the literature neglects the 
interactions between siblings in family structure and different parental preferences 
towards children, depending on birth order or gender. Second, there is usually 
a complementarity in the accumulation of human capital in different stages of life. 
However, empirically, this is not the case. Even though the life-cycle models 
capture well the ongoing process of acquiring human capital, the early investments 
prove to be the most effective. Third, empirical literature stands clearly that 
income risk affects not only fertility decisions but also human capital investment. 
Since low-income individuals face high volatility of income, it would be to useful 
account for that feature in the context of social mobility. Lastly, in the vast 
majority of papers, the fertility is exogenous. However, the interactions between 
fertility timing and human capital investments are distinct. Investing in the quality 
of a child takes time and money – resources constrained for young parents. With 
fertility rates dropping below replacement rates, the analysis of policies in this 
framework may be crucial. 
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